Strongly Time-consistent Solutions for Two-stage Network Games by Gao, Hongwei et al.
Strongly Time-consistent Solutions
for Two-stage Network Games
Hongwei Gao 1 Leon Petrosyan 2 Artem Sedakov 2
1College of Mathematics
Qingdao University
2Department of Game Theory and Statistical Decisions
Saint Petersburg State University
June 3, 2014
Strongly Time-consistent Solutions for Two-stage Network Games H. Gao, L. Petrosyan, A. Sedakov 1/30
Outline
1 The model
2 Cooperation in two-stage network game
3 Strongly time-consistent solution
4 Numerical example
Strongly Time-consistent Solutions for Two-stage Network Games H. Gao, L. Petrosyan, A. Sedakov 2/30
The Model
N = {1, . . . , n}: a ﬁnite set of players who can interact with each
other.
g : a ﬁnite set of pairs (i , j) ∈ N × N, or a network.
If (i , j) ∈ g , we say that there is a link connecting players i and j ,
and, therefore, communication of the players.
In our setting we suppose that all links are undirected, i.e. (i , j) =
(j , i).
For the simplicity denote (i , j) as ij .
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Consider a two-stage problem:
At the ﬁrst stage each player chooses his partnersother
players with whom he wants to form links. After choosing
partners and establishing links, players, thereby, form a
network.
At the second stage having the network formed, each player
chooses a control inﬂuencing his payoﬀ.
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First Stage: Network Formation
Mi ⊆ N \ {i}: the set of players whom player i ∈ N can oﬀer a
mutual link.
ai ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}: the maximal number of links which player i can
oﬀer.
Behavior of player i ∈ N at the ﬁrst stage is a proﬁle gi = (gi1, . . . , gin)
which components are deﬁned as:
gij =
{
1, if player i oﬀers a link to j ∈ Mi ,
0, otherwise,
(1)
subject to the constrain:∑
j∈N
gij 6 ai , (2)
gii = 0, i ∈ N.
Gi = {gi : (1)− (2) are true}, i ∈ N.
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Players choose their behaviors at the ﬁrst stage simultaneously and
independently from each other.
In particular, player i ∈ N chooses gi ∈ Gi , and as a result the
behavior proﬁle (g1, . . . , gn) is formed.
Having the behavior proﬁle (g1, . . . , gn) formed, an undirected link
ij = ji is established in network g if and only if
gij = gji = 1,
i.e. g consists of mutual links which were oﬀered only by both players.
Example
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and players choose the following behaviors at
the ﬁrst stage: g1 = (0, 1, 1, 1), g2 = (1, 0, 1, 0), g3 = (1, 1, 0, 0),
g4 = (0, 0, 1, 0). The resulting network g contains three links
{12, 13, 23}.
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Second Stage: Controls
Ni (g) = {j ∈ N \ {i} : ij ∈ g}: neighbors of player i in network g .
Let di (g) = (di1(g), . . . , din(g)) be deﬁned as follows:
dij(g) =

1, if i does not break the link formed
at the ﬁrst stage
with player j ∈ Ni (g) in network g ,
0, otherwise.
(3)
Di (g) = {di (g) : (3) is true}.
Proﬁle (d1(g), . . . , dn(g)) changes network g and forms a new network,
denoted by gd . In network gd all links ij such that either dij(g) = 0
or dji (g) = 0 are removed.
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At the second stage player i ∈ N chooses control ui from a ﬁnite set
Ui .
Behavior of player i ∈ N at the second stage is a pair (di (g), ui ):
it deﬁnes, on the one hand, links to be removed di (g), and, on the
other hand, control ui .
Payoﬀ function Ki of player i : it rules, depends on player's behavior
at the second stage as well as behavior of his neighbors in network
gd .
Ki (ui , uNi (gd )), i ∈ N, is non-negative real-valued function deﬁned
on the set Ui ×
∏
j∈Ni (gd ) Uj and satisﬁes the following property:
(P): for any two networks g and g ′ and player i if
|Ni (g)| > |Ni (g ′)|, the inequality
Ki (ui , uNi (g)) > Ki (ui , uNi (g ′)) holds for all
(ui , uNi (g)) ∈ Ui ×
∏
j∈Ni (g) Uj and
(ui , uNi (g ′)) ∈ Ui ×
∏
j∈Ni (g ′) Uj .
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Cooperation in Two-stage Network Game
We study the cooperative case and answer three main questions:
What is a cooperative solution in the game?
Can it be realized in the game?
Is it strongly time-consistent?
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Suppose now that players jointly choose their behaviors at both
stages of the game. Acting as one player and choosing gi ∈ Gi ,
ui ∈ Ui , i ∈ N, the grand coalition, N, maximizes the value:∑
i∈N
Ki (ui , uNi (g)). (4)
Let the maximum be attained when players' behavior proﬁles g∗i , u
∗
i ,
i ∈ N are chosen, and proﬁle (g∗1 , . . . , g∗n ) forms network g∗.
Proposition
d∗i (g
∗) = g∗i for all i ∈ N, i.e. players should not remove links from
network g∗.
Let∑
i∈N
Ki (u
∗
i , u
∗
Ni (g∗)) = maxgi∈Gi ,i∈N
max
ui∈Ui ,i∈N
∑
i∈N
Ki (ui , uNi (g)).
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To allocate the maximal sum of players' payoﬀs according to some
imputation, we construct an auxiliary cooperative TU-game (N,V ).
The characteristic function V is constructed as follows.
Proposition
In the cooperative two-stage network game the superadditive
characteristic function V (·) in the sense of von Neumann and
Morgenstern is deﬁned as:
V (N) =
∑
i∈N
Ki (u
∗
i , u
∗
Ni (g∗)),
V (S) = max
gi∈Gi ,i∈S
max
ui∈Ui ,i∈S
∑
i∈S
Ki (ui , uNi (g)∩S),
V (∅) = 0.
For a singleton {i}, its value is deﬁned in the following way:
V ({i}) = max
ui∈Ui
Ki (ui ).
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An imputation in the cooperative two-stage network game is an n-
dimensional proﬁle ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn), satisfying
∑
i∈N ξi = V (N) and
ξi > V ({i}) for all i ∈ N. The set of all imputations in the game
(N,V ) we denote by I (V ).
A cooperative solution concept in the auxiliary cooperative TU-game
(N,V ) is a rule that uniquely assigns a subset CSC (V ) ⊆ I (V ) to
the game (N,V ). For example, if the cooperative solution concept
is the core C (V ), then
CSC (V ) = C (V ) =
{
ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn) :
∑
i∈S
ξi > V (S), S ⊆ N
}
.
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Suppose that at the beginning of the game players jointly decide to
choose behavior proﬁles g∗i , u
∗
i , i ∈ N and then allocate it according
to a speciﬁed cooperative solution concept CSC (V ) which realizes
the imputation ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn). It means that in the cooperative
two-stage network game player i ∈ N should receive the amount of
ξi as his payoﬀ.
What will happen if after the ﬁrst stage (after choosing the proﬁles
g∗1 , . . . , g
∗
n ) players recalculate the imputation according to the same
cooperative solution concept?
Recalculated Imputation is diﬀerent!
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Let g∗ be formed at the ﬁrst stage. If players recalculate the imputation,
one needs to construct a new cooperative game (N, v(g∗)), provided
network g∗ is ﬁxed.
Proposition
The superadditive characteristic function v(g∗, ·) in the sense of
von Neumann and Morgenstern is deﬁned as:
v(g∗,N) =
∑
i∈N
Ki (u
∗
i , u
∗
Ni (g∗)),
v(g∗, S) = max
ui∈Ui ,i∈S
∑
i∈S
Ki (ui , uNi (g∗)∩S),
v(g∗,∅) = 0,
For a singleton {i}, its value is deﬁned in the following way:
v(g∗, {i}) = max
ui∈Ui
Ki (ui ) = V ({i}),
and it does not depend on the network.
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An imputation is an n-dimensional proﬁle ξ(g∗) = (ξ1(g∗), . . . , ξn(g∗)),
satisfying both the eﬃciency condition and the individual rationality
condition: ∑
i∈N
ξi (g
∗) = v(g∗,N),
ξi (g
∗) > v(g∗, {i}), i ∈ N.
The set of all imputations in the game (N, v(g∗)) we denote by
I (v(g∗)).
A cooperative solution concept in the auxiliary cooperative TU-game
(N, v(g∗)) with ﬁxed network g∗ is a rule that uniquely assigns a
subset CSC (v(g∗)) ⊆ I (v(g∗)) to the game (N, v(g∗)). For example,
if the cooperative solution concept is the core C (v(g∗)), then
C (v(g∗)) =
{
ξ(g∗) = (ξ1(g∗), . . . , ξn(g∗)) :
∑
i∈S
ξi (g
∗) > v(g∗, S), S ⊆ N
}
.
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Deﬁnition
An imputation ξ ∈ CSC (V ) is said to be time-consistent if there
exists an imputation ξ(g∗) ∈ CSC (v(g∗)) such that the following
equality holds for all players:
ξi = ξi (g
∗), i ∈ N. (5)
A cooperative solution concept CSC (V ) is time consistent if any
imputation ξ ∈ CSC (V ) is time-consistent.
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Deﬁnition
Imputation distribution procedure for ξ in the cooperative
two-stage network game is a matrix
β =
 β11 β12... ...
βn1 βn2
 ,
where
ξi = βi1 + βi2, i ∈ N.
The payment scheme is applied: player i ∈ N at the ﬁrst stage of
the game receives the payment βi1, at the second stage of the game
he receives the payment βi2.
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Deﬁnition
Imputation distribution procedure β for ξ is time-consistent if
ξi − βi1 = ξi (g∗), for all i ∈ N.
It is obvious that time-consistent imputation distribution procedure
for ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn) in the cooperative two-stage network game can
be deﬁned as follows:
βi1 = ξi − ξi (g∗), (6)
βi2 = ξi (g
∗), i ∈ N.
In case of the cooperative solution concept CSC (V ) assigns multiple
allocations (for example, the core), more strict property of imputation
distribution procedure can be usedthe strong time-consistency property.
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Deﬁnition
An imputation ξ ∈ CSC (V ) is said to be strongly time-consistent if
the following inclusion is satisﬁed:
CSC (v(g∗)) ⊆ CSC (V ). (7)
A cooperative solution concept CSC (V ) is strongly time-consistent
if any imputation ξ ∈ CSC (V ) is strongly time-consistent.
Therefore, the core C (V ) is strongly time-consistent if C (v(g∗)) ⊆
C (V ). Unfortunately, for strongly time-consistent imputation distribution
procedures it is impossible even to derive formulas similar to (6).
Proposition
In two-stage cooperative games the core C (V ) is time-consistent
but not strongly time-consistent.
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Deﬁnition
Imputation distribution procedure β for ξ is strongly
time-consistent if
(β11, . . . , βn1)⊕ CSC (v(g∗)) ⊆ CSC (V ), (8)
where a⊕ A = {a+ a′ : a′ ∈ A, a ∈ Rn,A ⊂ Rn}.
Note, that strongly time-consistent imputation distribution procedure
β for an imputation from the core C (V ) satisﬁes the inclusion:
(β11, . . . , βn1)⊕ C (v(g∗)) ⊆ C (V ). (9)
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Numerical Example
N = {1, 2, 3}.
Subsets of players to whom each player can oﬀer a link are: M1 =
{2, 3},M2 = {1, 3},M3 = {1}.
A number of links each players can oﬀer: a1 = a2 = a3 = 1.
Therefore, at the ﬁrst stage sets of players' behaviors are:
G1 = {(0, 0, 0); (0, 1, 0); (0, 0, 1)},
G2 = {(0, 0, 0); (1, 0, 0); (0, 0, 1)},
G3 = {(0, 0, 0); (1, 0, 0)},
and only three networks can be formed at the ﬁrst stage of the game:
the empty network (the network without links, g = ∅), g = {12},
and g = {13}.
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Suppose that sets of controls Ui at the second stage for any network
g , realized at the ﬁrst stage, are the same U1 = U2 = U3 = {A,B},
and payoﬀ functions are deﬁned as:
Ki (ui ) : Ki (A) = 1, Ki (B) = 0, i = 1, 2, 3,
K1(u1, u2) : K1(A,A) = 2, K1(A,B) = 4, K1(B,A) = 1, K1(B,B) = 3,
K1(u1, u3) : K1(A,A) = 3, K1(A,B) = 5, K1(B,A) = 1, K1(B,B) = 3,
K2(u2, u1) : K2(A,A) = 2, K2(A,B) = 4, K2(B,A) = 1, K2(B,B) = 3,
K3(u3, u1) : K3(A,A) = 2, K3(A,B) = 5, K3(B,A) = 1, K3(B,B) = 4.
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Consider the case of cooperation at both stages. In this case the
maximal value ∑
i∈N
Ki (u
∗
i , u
∗
Ni (g∗)) = 8,
and it can be reached if players choose the following behaviors:
g∗1 = (0, 0, 1), g
∗
2 = (0, 0, 0), g
∗
3 = (1, 0, 0),
u∗1 = B, u
∗
2 = A, u
∗
3 = B.
Note that behavior proﬁle g∗1 , g
∗
2 , g
∗
3 at the ﬁrst stage forms the
network g∗ = {13}.
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Calculate values of characteristic function V (S) for all coalitions
S ⊆ N: V (N) = 8, V ({1, 2}) = 6, V ({1, 3}) = 7, V ({2, 3}) = 2,
V ({1}) = V ({2}) = V ({3}) = 1.
The core C (V ):
ξ1 + ξ3 = 7,
ξ1 > 5,
ξ2 = 1,
ξ3 > 1.
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Consider now cooperation at the second stage of the game, provided
that network g∗ = {13} at the ﬁrst stage is ﬁxed.
Calculate values of characteristic function v(g∗,S) for all coalitions
S ⊆ N: v({13},N) = 8, v({13}, {1, 2}) = v({13}, {2, 3}) = 2,
v({13}, {1, 3}) = 7, v({13}, {1}) = v({13}, {2}) = v({13}, {3}) =
1.
The core C (v({13})):
ξ1({13}) + ξ3({13}) = 7,
ξ1({13}) > 1,
ξ2({13}) = 1,
ξ3({13}) > 1.
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Since C (V ) ⊂ C (v(g∗)), the core C (V ) is time-consistent cooperative
solution concept in two-stage network games but it is obvious that
the core C (V ) is not strongly time-consistent (inclusion (7) does not
hold).
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Consider another cooperative solution conceptthe τ -value. In the
cooperative two-stage network game the τ -value τ = (τ1, . . . , τn) is
calculated as follows:
τi = mi (V ) + αV (Mi (V )−mi (V )) , (10)
where
Mi (V ) = V (N)− V (N \ {i}),
mi (V ) = max
S3i
V (S)− ∑
j∈S\{i}
Mj(V )
 ,
αV =

0, M(V ) = m(V ),∑
i∈N
Mi (V )−
∑
i∈N
mi (V )
V (N)−∑
i∈N
mi (V )
, otherwise.
Using (10), we obtain: τ = (512 , 1, 1
1
2).
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In the similar way one can calculate the τ -value τ(g∗) = (τ1(g∗), . . . , τn(g∗))
if network g∗ is formed at the ﬁrst stage of the game:
τi (g
∗) = mi (v(g∗)) + αv(g∗) (Mi (v(g∗))−mi (v(g∗))) , (11)
where
Mi (v(g
∗)) = v(g∗,N)− v(g∗,N \ {i}),
mi (v(g
∗)) = max
S3i
v(g∗,S)− ∑
j∈S\{i}
Mj(v(g
∗))
 ,
αv(g∗) =

0, M(v(g∗)) = m(v(g∗)),∑
i∈N
Mi (v(g
∗))−∑
i∈N
mi (v(g
∗))
v(g∗,N)−∑
i∈N
mi (v(g∗))
, otherwise.
Using (11), we obtain: τ(g∗) = (312 , 1, 3
1
2).
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Note that the τ -value is time-inconsistent since there exists a player
i ∈ N that
τi 6= τi (g∗).
Nevertheless, one can ﬁnd time-consistent imputation distribution
procedure β for the τ -value (which will also be strongly time-consistent
since the τ -value is the single-valued cooperative solution concept):
β12 = τ1(g
∗) = 312 , β11 = τ1 − τ1(g∗) = 2,
β22 = τ2(g
∗) = 1, β21 = τ2 − τ2(g∗) = 0,
β32 = τ3(g
∗) = 312 , β31 = τ3 − τ3(g∗) = −2,
or in the matrix form:
β =
 2 3120 1
−2 312
 .
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